

6 FEB 1974

#6-74

STATS REC

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070006-2

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF


1 OF 1

Confidential

F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda



STATSPEC

Confidential

6 FEBRUARY 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 6)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.



STATSPEC

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

CONTENTS

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Moscow Takes Credit for Contribution to Disengagement Accord 1

USSR-CUBA

Declaration Proclaims Solidarity, Notes Obstacles to Detente 3

INDOCHINA

Publicity for DRV National Assembly Reveals 22d Party Plenum 5

DRV Leaders Make Annual Tet Visits; Giap Still Missing 6

Sihanouk-DRV Differences Reflected in Hanoi Visit Coverage 7

USSR

Brezhnev Urges Major Changes in Soviet Agriculture 9

CHINA

PEOPLE'S DAILY Editorial Leads New Assault on Lin, Confucius 13

New PRC Statements Warn on Islands, Restate Resources Claim. 15

NOTES

Peking on Japanese Militarism; Thailand Infiltration Denial;
Replacement of Mindszenty; DRV Party Anniversary 17

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Soviet Politburo Members Address

Foreign Policy Issues. S1

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. i

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 1 -

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

MOSCOW TAKES CREDIT FOR CONTRIBUTION TO DISENGAGEMENT ACCORD

In the wake of the successful conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement negotiations, Moscow has made some effort to claim a share of the credit for this achievement and to prod the Syrians into similar talks with Israel. These themes were broached in a 30 January PRAVDA Observer article, and they have been reiterated in a 3 February Moscow Radio domestic service observers roundtable discussion.

The Moscow radio panelists went a step beyond the Observer article by openly conceding that U.S. officials, "including" Secretary Kissinger, had played a part in concluding the agreement. But panelist Primakov maintained that this would not have been possible without the "active contribution" of Soviet diplomacy. And another commentator, Matveyev, injected the sour grapes observation that the U.S. negotiators enjoyed the advantage of diplomatic communications with Israel, seeming to imply that the Soviet role might have been more prominent except for this fortuitous circumstance.

SYRIA Neither the PRAVDA Observer article nor the panelists directly endorsed Syrian-Israeli disengagement negotiations, but Matveyev did note that this problem still had to be solved between Syria and Israel. Primakov professed concern that "certain Western commentators" were saying that if Syria did not participate in the first stage of the Geneva conference, all issues relating to Syria might be shelved. No peace settlement is possible, Primakov asserted, without a solution to the "vital issues" regarding liberation of occupied Syrian territory.

Moscow has otherwise had little to say on the Syrian-Israeli issue. The joint Soviet-Cuban declaration on Brezhnev's visit to Cuba hinted at the need for a Syrian-Israeli accord, in the vein of Brezhnev's Havana rally speech on the 29th, when it referred to "partial measures which do not cover the entire zone of the conflict." A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 1 February reported Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi as stating that resumption of the Geneva conference required a disengagement of forces on the Syrian front. And an Arabic-language broadcast on the 3d reported Syrian Foreign Minister Knaddam

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 2 -

as saying Syria was prepared to conclude an agreement on disengagement provided such an agreement was considered a first step toward Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and restoration of the Palestinians' rights.

Support for Palestinian participation in the Geneva conference was reaffirmed in an Arabic-language commentary on 1 February which extolled Soviet "moral, political and material assistance and direct and indirect help" to the Palestinians. But the broadcast also proffered the advice that solution of the Palestinian question depends first on the Palestinians themselves "and on their organization and cohesion."

HAYKAL REMOVAL TASS on 2 February reported without comment President as-Sadat's 1 February appointment of AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal as presidential press adviser and Information Minister Hatim's appointment as chairman of AL-AHRAM's board. On the 4th, TASS and Moscow's Arabic-language service briefly noted that 'Ali Amin had been appointed chief editor of AL-AHRAM in place of Haykal, who was "also relieved of his duties" as board chairman.

Moscow's press from time to time in the past engaged in polemical exchanges with Haykal, but Soviet media rarely reported his Friday articles in AL-AHRAM. TASS on 1 February, however, just prior to the announcement of his removal, had carried a straightforward summary of his last article in which he criticized U.S. policy in the Middle East and concluded that it had undergone no change since the October war.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 3 -

USSR - CUBA

DECLARATION PROCLAIMS SOLIDARITY, NOTES OBSTACLES TO DETENTE

Signs of hard bargaining are apparent in the joint declaration issued by the Soviet and Cuban governments on 3 February at the conclusion of Brezhnev's highly publicized trip to Cuba. Although proclaiming a "complete identity of views" on a wide range of foreign and domestic policy issues, the document in fact registers a patchwork of unreconciled views on some of the more critical issues affecting relations between the two countries. The impression that the document registers an agreement to disagree is most apparent on the issue of detente, where brief references reflecting current Soviet positions are counter-balanced by statements reflecting the ideological rhetoric cultivated by Cuba. Judging by these rhetorical trade-offs, the Cubans came off at least even in the verbal formulations that were devised to reflect the behind-the-scenes bargaining between the two sides.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS In assessing East-West relations, the declaration took note of the changes in international relations that were bringing about a turn from "the cold war to detente." It attributed this turn entirely to the "peace-loving" forces of the world and to Soviet foreign policy, although Brezhnev in his rally speech had given credit to "far-sighted" leaders in the West. The declaration warned of the persistent "aggressive" nature of imperialism and of efforts through "reactionary propaganda" to "slander" the achievements of socialism. And with respect to the United States specifically, it charged that "opponents of detente" were becoming more active and that they were trying to "thwart" the normalization of Soviet-American relations.

Cuban support for the general Soviet line on inter-party issues was clearly implied in the document's declaration that the two sides were "irreconcilable" both to "rightwing and leftwing revisionism," and to "hegemonistic and chauvinist tendencies" which contradict the course collectively worked out by the communist parties. These codeword attacks on China were made more explicit in Castro's rally speech, in which he assailed "pseudo-leftwingers and renegades," who from allegedly Marxist positions "betray the Soviet Union, proletarian internationalism, and serve the interests of imperialism."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 4 -

Soviet media occasionally raised the issue of Cuban-U.S. relations in reporting Western news coverage of the visit. Thus, PRAVDA on 31 January cited the U.S. press as calling for the normalization of relations to further relax international tensions. And Soviet commentator Matveyev, on the Moscow domestic service observers roundtable on 3 February, seemed to be advocating much the same thing in asserting that "Latin America does not and cannot stand aside from the main course of international detente that is making headway in the world."

BILATERAL ISSUES On bilateral issues the declaration focused on economic relations. The document stated that economic cooperation will be "constantly developed and improved on a long-term basis" in accordance with the economic agreements signed in 1972. In an apparent reference to Cuba's accession to CEMA that year, the declaration called for wider cooperation between Soviet and Cuban planning agencies and increased contacts between state, trade union, and other public bodies.

On the standard Cuban demands regarding the lifting of the international blockade and the dismantling of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, the declaration registered pro-forma Soviet support. The formulations were somewhat less militant, however, than those used in the last comparable joint statement issued after Castro's visit to Moscow in July 1972. Whereas the earlier declaration had described the blockade as "conducted by the United States," the present declaration omits this specification. And whereas the earlier declaration had added to its denunciation of the Guantanamo base a promise that the Soviet Union would continue to assist in "the reinforcement of the country's defensive capacity and the defense of its revolutionary conquests," the present one omits this promise.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 5 -

INDOCHINA

PUBLICITY FOR DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REVEALS 22D PARTY PLENUM

Hanoi publicity for the fourth session of the DRV National Assembly, convened on 4 February, revealed that the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee had recently held its 22d plenum. The media have provided no information about the 21st plenum, although the 20th was revealed in March 1972, again in the course of reporting a National Assembly session. The 19th plenum had been explicitly announced in a communique in February 1971--shortly before the National Assembly Standing Committee announced plans for a new election of deputies. The failure to have mentioned the holding of the 21st plenum accords with the silence during the war years regarding the 13th through the 18th, presumably held between August 1965 and early 1971.

Initial reports from Hanoi radio and VNA on 4 February outlined a routine agenda for the National Assembly session and said that Truong Chinh, National Assembly Standing Committee chairman, opened the first meeting and that Vice Premier Le Thang Nghi presented the "government report" on the tasks for 1974-1975 and the 1974 state plan. Summaries of opening day speeches broadcast by Hanoi on the 5th provided the first indication the assembly session was being held on the heels of a party plenum, noting that Truong Chinh said the present session convened not only on the VWP's 44th anniversary but also "immediately after the party Central Committee held its 22d plenum to approve the resolution on the tasks and guidelines concerning the economic restoration and development in the northern part of our country in 1974 and 1975."

ASSEMBLY PRESIDIUUM Hanoi media have displayed some inconsistency regarding the inclusion of First Secretary Le Duan's name in the listing of the honorary presidium for the assembly meeting--a listing not necessarily indicating the actual presence of the leaders. Thus, Le Duan was included in VNA English- and French-language transmissions as well as in a Hanoi Mandarin broadcast--which uniquely also listed Defense Minister Giap. But Le Duan's name has been omitted in all Hanoi domestic radio versions to date. While the First Secretary has not ordinarily played an active role in National Assembly deliberations, at the previous three sessions Le Duan was consistently included in the presidiums and listed after Ton Duc Thang and Nguyen Luong Bang and before Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong--the same ranking shown in the VNA reports. The communique customarily released at the end of each assembly session may provide clarification.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 6 -

DRV LEADERS MAKE ANNUAL TET VISITS; GIAP STILL MISSING

Hanoi media since 23 January have been reporting the traditional Tet visits by DRV leaders to various localities and groups. While in recent years visits were generally confined to Hanoi, this year most of the top leadership--one exception being President Ton Duc Thang, who remained in the capital--traveled also to the provinces to convey their New Year's greetings. Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, who has not appeared in public since last fall, was not reported as making any Tet visits this year--visits that have been his custom since at least as far back as 1968.

First Secretary Le Duan's visit to Ho Chi Minh's native village in Nghe An and his subsequent trip to Ha Tinh were accorded extensive coverage by Hanoi media. He also spent time in Hanoi greeting worker families and was singled out for special recognition, being referred to by Hanoi radio as "venerated and beloved uncle." While Le Duan has previously been referred to affectionately on separate occasions as "venerated and beloved" and as "uncle," the combined use of such terms of respect simultaneously has been a distinction reserved for Ho Chi Minh. Truong Chinh's foray into the southern panhandle area of Quang Binh and Vinh Linh also received full, albeit somewhat delayed coverage. Even though Truong Chinh reportedly arrived in the area before the New Year holidays began, Hanoi broadcasts, probably for security considerations, did not report his presence there until 30 January, well after Tet was over.

Premier Pham Van Dong's visits in Hanoi and to Ha Tay, Le Duc Tho's to Thanh Hoa and Nam Ha, and Van Tien Dung's in Hanoi and to the Viet Bac Autonomous Region were duly recorded by Hanoi media. While Le Thang Nghi and Hoang Van Hoan were not reported to have made holiday visits, media accounts listed them present at public functions within a few days of Tet, and Nguyen Duy Trinh reportedly gave a 22 January interview to an AFP correspondent in Hanoi.

Of the remaining Politburo members not accounted for this year--Giap, Pham Hung, and Tran Quoc Hoan--only Giap has ever been reported to have made Tet visits in the past. In fact, Giap has been consistently reported as participating in such visits every year from 1968 to 1973. His current absence from public view extends back to 6 October, when he reportedly accompanied PRG/NFLSV leader Nguyen Huu Tho during a stopover

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 7 -

in Hanoi.* In what may be an attempt to counter possible speculation about his long disappearance, the December issue of the Hanoi monthly VAN HOA NGHE THUAT (Culture and Arts) ran two undated photographs of Giap, one identifying him as reviewing a formation of what appears to be female troops at an undisclosed place and another from a scene in a documentary film entitled "Hanoi, a Song of Heroism" showing him standing before a large map "reviewing air defense and air force combat plans."

SIHANOUK-DRV DIFFERENCES REFLECTED IN HANOI VISIT COVERAGE

Persistent differences between Cambodian Prince Sihanouk and his Vietnamese supporters seem reflected in Hanoi's cursory treatment of the prince's 22-26 January visit to the DRV capital for the Tet holidays. Unlike Sihanouk's previous Hanoi visits at this time each year since his ouster in March 1970, this year there was no joint statement noting Vietnamese-Cambodian "unanimity" nor any NHAN DAN editorial expressing DRV support marking the visit.

Sihanouk met with Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Foreign Minister Trinh, and he replied to a speech by Premier Dong at a banquet in his honor on the 24th. Dong routinely lauded Sihanouk as the representative of the "legality, legitimacy and continuity of the Cambodian state," promised continued support until the FUNK's five points are achieved, and denounced the "Lon Nol traitorous clique." Sihanouk duly reaffirmed Front opposition to a compromise settlement and reiterated his standing offer to establish relations with the United States provided it ends its interference in Cambodian affairs.

MILITARY OFFENSIVE Sihanouk ignored the Front's dry season offensive against Phnom Penh, which is consistent with the recent reticence and apparent uncertainty in Front media about prospects for the military drive. Last fall Front spokesmen, including Sihanouk, had heralded the "decisive" dry season campaign and had portrayed the Lon Nol regime as being in danger of imminent collapse. Since early January they have fallen generally silent on these issues, and only low-level comment from the insurgents' radio stations has continued to predict the impending fall of Phnom Penh's defenses. RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth seemed to acknowledge growing Front

* For a review of Giap's current absence from public view, see the TRENDS of 28 December 1973, pages 14-15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 8 -

uncertainty over the offensive in his New Year's message last month, in which he duly expressed "hope" that 1974 would bring "complete victory" but warned that Front leaders "are actively preparing ourselves for a long-range struggle."

Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow have maintained their recent low postures on Cambodian developments, generally avoiding authoritative expressions of support. The recent decline in Peking's attention to Cambodian events over the past year was evident in NCNA's ignoring Penn Nouth's current New Year's message, in contrast to last year when it replayed the text of the pronouncement.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 9 -

U S S R

BREZHNEV URGES MAJOR CHANGES IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE

Recent articles and speeches have revealed that Brezhnev's unpublished speech at the 10-11 December CPSU Central Committee plenum urged kolkhozes and sovkhozes to join together in inter-farm associations to finance and manage the large specialized agricultural complexes required for more efficient farming. At the plenum Brezhnev specifically endorsed Moldavia's controversial kolkhoz councils as one form for managing interkolkhoz enterprises, and this endorsement has been followed by the dispatch to Moldavia of the head of USSR Gosplan, Nikolay Baybakov, for the announced purpose of studying the Moldavian innovation.

In pressing for large-scale agricultural specialization, the Brezhnev regime has moved with characteristic caution and minimal fanfare. A lengthy 16 December PRAVDA editorial on the plenum, which first disclosed the broad outlines of the new agricultural program, specifically warned against "going to extremes." Moreover, a recent article in Kommunist by Brezhnev's agricultural assistant has likewise indicated that the transition to large-scale specialization should be carried out gradually "without, of course, unwarranted haste."

BREZHNEV SPEECH Although Brezhnev's speech at the December plenum was not published, some of its specific contents and general features have since been made public. For example, the 16 December PRAVDA editorial, without attribution to the speech, stressed the urgency of placing agriculture on a modern industrial footing, pooling the resources and activities of individual farms, and developing large specialized agricultural complexes. It approvingly noted the spread of interkolkhoz and intersovkhoz activity on an increasingly wider scale and treated this development as a step toward the longstanding ideological goal of erasing the distinctions between the two forms of farm property. According to Western press reports, the editorial also sparked rumors that the kolkhoz system was about to be dismantled, which was denied by First Deputy USSR Minister of Agriculture L.I. Khitrin, at a Moscow press conference for foreign correspondents in late December that was not reported in the Soviet press.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 10 -

The fact that Brezhnev in his plenum speech had expressly endorsed the Moldavian experiment in transferring control of kolkhozes from the agriculture ministry to kolkhoz councils, was revealed by Politburo member Pelshe in a 9 January speech at an awards ceremony in Kishinev.* A calculated effort to publicize Brezhnev's stand was evident in the handling of Pelshe's speech. Thus the disclosure was included in PRAVDA's summary of the speech as well as in the fuller accounts carried in the local media.

More details about the general thrust of Brezhnev's plenum speech were provided by Central Committee agricultural secretary Kulakov in a speech at an 18 January awards ceremony in Baku. According to a report in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY the next day, Kulakov declared that "the time has come, as Leonid Ilich graphically said, to give the green light to interfarm enterprises--to create large interkolkhoz, intersovkhoz, and sovkhov-kolkhoz livestock farms and complexes. . . ." At a 14 January agricultural conference in Frunze, reported in SOVIET KIRGIZIA two days later, Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev quoted extensive passages from Brezhnev's plenum speech on the desirability of creating large livestock farms and specialized agricultural complexes. On the sources of funding, Usubaliyev cited a statement by Brezhnev indicating that the interfarm associations, rather than the state, would have to bear the brunt of the costs of building and maintaining the new complexes.

KOMMUNIST ARTICLE Brezhnev's goals were spelled out in great detail in an article on interfarm cooperation in the December issue of KOMMUNIST, released shortly after the plenum. The article is noteworthy on several counts. It was co-authored by Brezhnev's longtime agricultural assistant, V.A. Golikov, and the Moldavian deputy premier for agriculture, G.A. Dolgoshey. Though mentioning Brezhnev's plenum speech only in passing, the article was clearly written with the plenum in mind, as it covered much the same ground as the publicly disclosed portions of this speech. Moreover, the article explicitly related the development of interfarm cooperation in Moldavia, which has become fairly commonplace in other areas of the Soviet Union in recent years, to the more controversial Moldavian kolkhoz council experiment.

* For a report of Pelshe's disclosure see the TRENDS of 16 January 1974, page 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 11 -

The KOMMUNIST article stressed that future agricultural progress requires the pooling of farm resources, the expansion of interfarm activities and the creation of large-scale specialized complexes in agriculture similar to those in industry. It maintained that the specialized complexes are more efficient and more productive than individual farms and that resources for their creation must be found "mainly" in the funds of kolkhozes and sovkhoses, without additional outlays by the state. At the same time KOMMUNIST, as did the PRAVDA editorial, justified the transition from small-scale production by individual farms to large-scale specialization by mixed groups of kolkhozes and sovkhoses as a means of eliminating the differences between the two forms of farm property.

However, while emphasizing the importance of the new agricultural program, the KOMMUNIST authors acknowledged that there was resistance to the innovation among local authorities. They complained that many farms prefer to build their own, inefficient livestock farms and complexes and justify those facilities on purely proprietary grounds: "Even if not the best, they are at least our own." They also complained that "some oblast leaders" still fail to recognize the superiority of large-scale specialization. Apparently because of these concerns, the authors urged local party and government agencies to consult with scholars and specialists in formulating plans for agricultural intensification and specialization and to base those plans on a differentiated approach suited to local capabilities and conditions.

In pointing out the advantages of large-scale specialization, the KOMMUNIST article discussed in some detail the proliferation of interfarm activities in Moldavia in recent years. "The great scope of the interkolkhoz movement" in that republic was singled out as an important reason for the establishment of the kolkhoz councils there. As if to hint at a similar possibility elsewhere, the authors pointed to the extensive development of interkolkhoz activities in the Ukraine, where sentiment in favor of reforms similar to those of Moldavia has been especially strong in the past.

MOLDAVIAN EXPERIMENT The Brezhnev-Golikov proposals are consistent with the views advanced by Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul in promoting his kolkhoz council experiment. He has argued that interkolkhoz associations can utilize their resources to aid backward farms and build the large new complexes required for agricultural modernization. Such interkolkhoz organizations will, in Bodyul's view, become

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 12 -

the main form of agricultural organization, supplanting individual farms. In some Moldavian rayons, interkolkhoz associations for mechanization have been formed, with responsibility for transferring equipment from farm to farm depending on need. Although this innovation has provoked some resistance, it has been defended on grounds of efficiency. And despite Estonian warnings about the danger of creating a closed kolkhoz system, Moldavia has also promoted joint sovkhos-kolkhoz enterprises and has permitted the sovkhoses to join interkolkhoz associations and the kolkhozes to join sovkhos associations.

Since Brezhnev's endorsement of the Moldavian kolkhoz councils, the innovation has received more official attention in Moscow. Khitrin reportedly cited the developments in Moldavia in his Moscow press conference on agriculture. During his 7-11 January visit to Kishinev, Pelshe visited the Moldavian Council of Kolkhozes and was briefed on its operations by chairman N.M. Zaychenko. During his stay in Moldavia Pelshe repeatedly expressed admiration for the Moldavian innovations.

On 14 January Gosplan chairman Baybakov arrived in Kishinev for a special study of the Moldavian experiment. According to a report in SOVIET MOLDAVIA the next day, he spent the morning in the Moldavian Council of Kolkhozes, where Zaychenko explained in detail the structure of the councils and other new forms of kolkhoz administration. The Moldavian paper even carried a large frontpage picture of Zaychenko instructing Baybakov with the help of a large organizational chart. According to the paper, Baybakov displayed particular interest in the controversial associations for mechanization.

In addition to briefing Pelshe and Baybakov, Zaychenko also spoke at a 12 January Moscow plenum of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, explaining Moldavia's interkolkhoz system. As republic kolkhoz council chairman, Zaychenko has become one of the republic's leading officials. At a 19 December Moldavian Central Committee plenum he was promoted to candidate member of the republic bureau--a personal reward as well as a sign of the enhanced status of the kolkhoz councils in the eyes of the republic's hierarchy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 13 -

CHINA

PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL LEADS NEW ASSAULT ON LIN, CONFUCIUS

A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of 2 February has raised the anti-Confucius campaign to a new level of authority and has warned cadres and intellectuals that they must actively participate in the struggle. The editorial referred to the movement as being "initiated and led by our great leader Chairman Mao," an assertion substantiated by its advocacy of continuous political ferment. The editorial dramatized the need for wide participation by quoting from a Mao poem "Swimming," written in 1956. The quoted portion reads: "I care not that the wind blows and the waves beat; it is better than idly strolling in a courtyard." The last lines of this stanza, not quoted in the editorial, note the opposite beliefs of Confucius, who idled on the river bank and passively watched the river flow without trying to change its course. The clear warning to intellectuals and cadres is that they will not be allowed to assume a passive role, that they will be required to "go against the tide," and that if they do not, they will suffer the consequences of being lumped with Confucius in a future stage of the campaign.

While the editorial conveyed a clear warning to cadres and intellectuals, it did not designate them as a target for attack. Instead, it took specific note of the progress made by "some intellectuals who were quite deeply affected by the poison of Confucius and Mencius," but who are educating themselves in the course of the campaign. Although the editorial warned cadres that the issue of criticizing Lin and Confucius "is a test for every leading comrade," it did not spell out the consequences of failing the test and cited appropriate activities for such leaders at this stage of the campaign. Much of the editorial, however, does seem to reflect a strong concern on Mao's part about the current relationship between cadres and intellectuals on one hand and the masses on the other. In this context, the editorial denounced Lin and Confucius for advocating such ideas as innate wisdom and genius, rule by virtue, and the fallacy that mental workers should rule over manual laborers.

Echoing a number of earlier Peking and provincial articles on the Confucius campaign, the editorial authoritatively called for mass participation in the struggle, telling workers, peasants and soldiers to "rise in action" and referring to them as "most

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 14 -

competent" and "most daring." However, provincial mass rallies are being led by local party leaders, which indicates that orders are being passed down by regular party channels and that at this stage there is to be no turn toward cultural revolution anarchy.

PROVINCIAL REACTION The clearest statement thus far on leadership control over the mass movement came in a 1 February Hangchow radio commentary which said that the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign must involve "hundreds of thousands of workers, peasants and soliders." The commentary stated that "it goes without saying that, as in all other struggles, special contingents are needed in the struggle" against Lin and Confucius. The broadcast did not specify what kinds of contingents would be formed--perhaps having in mind the fate of work teams sent by Liu Shao-chi to control the cultural revolution--but said that they would be developed in the course of struggle. These contingents are to integrate with the broad masses to lay a "solid foundation" for the masses to play their role as main force. Authority for such contingents may be contained in the instruction of the joint editorial that leaders should go to grassroots units to test things at selected points. Thus far the Canton Military Region is the only administrative area reporting that top leaders have gone down to such points. Canton radio on 4 February reported that Jen Szu-chung had recently led a work team down to lower units as a trial point in the Confucian struggle.

Since late January, even before the publication of the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 2 February, provincial media have carried a barrage of items critical of Lin and Confucius. Virtually every provincial broadcast monitored in recent days has contained at least one such item, with some broadcasts totally devoted to critical articles and reports. The provincial articles have generally paralleled the themes in Peking central media reports. Since publication of the editorial the number of provincial articles has increased appreciably, and many have referred to the editorial for authority.

A number of provincial radios have reported mass rallies to denounce Lin and Confucius. Shanghai radio on 3 February reported one such rally at which representatives from Wang Hung-wen's former organization, the Shanghai No. 17 cotton mill, recalled the onset of the power-seizure stage of the cultural revolution. They were quoted as saying "we must continue to display the revolutionary spirit of the violent January storm, thoroughly criticize the ultrarightist essence of Lin Piao's line, and dig up the deep roots of Lin Piao's counterrevolutionary restoration." A Tsinghai provincial broadcast, like several other provincial reports, disparaged those who warn against

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 15 -

NEW PRC STATEMENTS WARN ON ISLANDS, RESTATE RESOURCES CLAIM

Two new PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman's statements on 4 February reemphasize Peking's sensitivity to alleged foreign encroachment on PRC-claimed islands and sea resources along the East Asian continental shelf, in the wake of its forceful assertion of sovereignty over the disputed Paracel Islands.

One of the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements, prompted by Saigon's recent show of force in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, called the GVN action "a new military provocation" and warned of Peking's "firm and unshakable" stand not to tolerate such actions. The statement did not refer directly to possible PRC military countermeasures in the Spratlys, but pointedly recalled the "heavy blow" Saigon had received for its earlier actions in the Paracels in January. The statement routinely reaffirmed Chinese claims to the Paracel, Spratly, and two other disputed South China Sea island groups, and underlined particular Chinese interest in the area's natural resources by claiming sovereignty not only over the islands themselves but also over "the sea areas around them." Peking had first laid specific claim to resources in the sea area around these islands in its 11 January 1974 foreign ministry spokesman statement, which initiated the public exchange with Saigon that preceded the armed clashes over the Paracels.*

The issue of sovereignty over sea resources was also raised in the other foreign ministry spokesman's statement on the 4th. The statement labeled as an "infringement of Chinese sovereignty" the 30 January Japan-Republic of Korea agreement on joint development of oil and gas deposits in the East China Sea continental shelf. Asserting that this is an infringement Peking "absolutely cannot accept," the spokesman warned that both parties would bear full responsibility for the consequences if they followed through with their announced scheme.

Despite this warning, the foreign ministry spokesman showed a degree of flexibility that is in sharp contrast to Peking's stand that its sovereignty over the islands is nonnegotiable. Thus, this statement called for consultation between China

* This statement and subsequent PRC pronouncements on the armed action in the Paracels are discussed in the 16 January 1974 TRENDS, pages 6-7, and 23 January 1974 TRENDS, pages 14-15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 16 -

and "the other countries concerned" to decide the delimitation of rights to the continental shelf through consultation. This accords with Peking's longstanding position favoring negotiations and accommodation to settle conflicting claims to continental shelves, as expressed in commentaries repeatedly in recent years. The last official PRC statement dealing specifically with the East Asian continental shelf, a 15 March 1973 foreign ministry spokesman's statement attacking a U.S. oil company's exploration--under South Korean sanction--in the shelf under the Yellow and East China seas, implicitly pointed up the need for negotiations in this area. It stated that "the areas of jurisdiction of China and her neighbors in the Yellow and East China seas have not yet been delimited." Though Peking has for years broadly claimed that seabed resources along its coast belong to China, its flexibility was indicated as long ago as 31 December 1970, when PEOPLE'S DAILY reprinted an article by noted British China scholar John Gittings that explained Peking's position on disputes over the shelf. It said:

"The Chinese cannot lay claim to the entire continental shelf in areas contiguous to Japan and South Korea (it should be the DPRK--PEOPLE'S DAILY editor's note), which also enjoy similar rights as coastal states. But in this kind of situation the rights should in theory be apportioned by mutual agreement--as has been done in the North Sea."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 17 -

NOTES

PEKING ON JAPANESE MILITARISM: A 2 February PEOPLE'S DAILY article has lashed out at Japan's ultrarightist Diet members in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for urging the revival of militarism in Japan; such attacks had been reined in following the normalization of relations with Japan in 1972. The article resurfacing the issue makes clear, however, that Peking's desire for detente with Japan will continue only so long as Japan adheres to its present policies regarding the PRC and Taiwan. Characterizing "Seirankai," the right-leaning LDP group, as representing "a noteworthy trend" toward "fascist rule, armament expansion and revision of the constitution," the article warned the "tiny gang" within the LDP to stop "raving" that Taiwan, Manchuria, and Mongolia are "Japan's lifeline." The article asserts that the anti-China LDP Dietmen "can in no way undermine the friendly relationship" between Japan and China and implicitly reminds all wings of the LDP not to take China's good will for granted. The decision to strike out at one of Tanaka's rivals within the LDP at this time may reflect Peking's underlying concern that Tanaka's weakening hold on the LDP increases the danger that pro-Taiwan and perhaps pro-Soviet elements may gain ground.

THAILAND INFILTRATION DENIAL: A 2 February denial that Pathet Lao forces were operating in Thailand, in a commentary on the clandestine Pathet Lao radio, represents the first time the Lao Patriotic Front has been known even to have acknowledged the existence of such claims, which have circulated in Thailand and abroad since April 1973. The commentary insisted that "Thai patriotic forces," and not Pathet Lao troops, were involved in attacks in Thailand's Nong Khai Province, across the Mekong River from Vientiane. The clandestine radio added that "the Bangkok powerholders" had accused the LPF in order to divert attention from Thai mercenaries in Laos and the continuing existence of U.S. military bases in Thailand. Dealing with another aspect of the historic Lao-Thai rivalry, the commentary also alluded to possible future Thai encroachment, warning that in the past Thailand had seized "three-fourths of Lao territory and five-sixths of the Lao population." Enlarging on the same theme, a recent article in the LPF's LAO HAK SAT paper claimed that the exiled son of ousted Thai Premier Kittikhachon was colluding with Laos rightwing leaders to form a new state consisting of northeastern Thailand and southern Laos.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FEIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 18 -

REPLACEMENT OF MINDSZENTY: The Budapest domestic service on 5 February announced the Vatican's replacement of Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty as primate of Hungary in a low-keyed manner calculated to downgrade the importance of the legendary anti-communist churchman. Dr. Laszlo Lekai, Mindszenty's successor as Apostolic Administrator of Esztergom, was named third in a list of four church personnel changes, and Mindszenty's title of Cardinal was omitted in the announcement. The new appointments, the brief announcement explained, were made by Pope Paul VI "after preliminary assent" by the Hungarian Presidential Council and after the Pope had declared the Archdiocese of Esztergom, "occupied hitherto formally by Jozsef Mindszenty, who left for abroad in 1971, vacant under canon law." In the only East European comment on the Vatican move, Poland's ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 6th reported the Pope's letter to "the senile Cardinal" and commented that the Vatican's decision "demonstrates its realism and desire to remove formal and political causes of friction in relations with socialist countries."

DRV PARTY ANNIVERSARY: The 44th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party on 2 February was marked by traditional NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials that briefly reviewed party history and provided bland discussions of current problems.

This year's NHAN DAN editorial implied continued stress on economic and industrial rebuilding in asserting that a third revolution--a technical revolution--was essential and would play the key role in "three coordinated revolutions." The other two, NHAN DAN noted, were "the socialist revolution in one part of a country that is continuing, through a revolutionary war, the people's democratic revolution in another part of the country." The 1973 NHAN DAN editorial marking the party anniversary similarly had described the party's primary task as "stepping up socialist construction in the North and at the same time completing the historic tasks of the national and democratic revolution in the South," and had described building a modern industry as the "central task of the North."

Avoiding the theoretical abstractions of NHAN DAN, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 3d declared--in evident reference to the military commitment to the South--that "our party members... have acquired political qualities and abilities necessary to fulfill their duties as vanguard combatants in all missions and on all fronts." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN asserted that the armed forces, in addition to their combat tasks, should be able to "actively contribute to socialist construction and to strengthen the rear base."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- S 1 -

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

SOVIET POLITBURO MEMBERS ADDRESS FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Since mid-November, almost all members of the CPSU Politburo have made speeches in which foreign affairs issues have been discussed at some length. Only Grishin, head of the Moscow city party committee, and Kunayev, Kazakh party boss, have not spoken out on foreign affairs. Most of the speeches were delivered at republic and regional awards ceremonies. The awards speeches, covering domestic as well as foreign affairs issues, have been carried in full by local media but have as a rule been reported only in abbreviated summaries in the central press. Only Brezhnev's award speeches last summer in Kiev, Alma-Ata, and Tashkent, and Podgornyy's speech in late July in Moscow were carried in full by the Moscow papers. The papers also carried extensive versions of remarks on foreign policy by Kosygin, speaking in Minsk on 14 November, and Gromyko, speaking in Armenia on 19 January.

The recent spate of speeches by top Soviet leaders represents the largest collection of this kind since the 24th CPSU Congress in March-April 1971. Although the public statements of the post-Khrushchev leadership have generally been more guarded than those of the Khrushchev era, the recent speeches provide sufficient grounds for comparison of the movement of opinion on foreign affairs within the Politburo.

EAST-WEST DETENTE The Politburo members have displayed remarkable unanimity in their basic approaches to detente. Though some were palpably more concerned than others about the concomitants of detente, there appeared to be a broad consensus in favor of improved relations with the West as a means of lessening the threat of nuclear war. Notably among those who came out strongly for detente on such restricted grounds were Suslov, Shelepin, and Andropov, all of whom have been widely considered in the West as hardliners on foreign affairs at one time or another.

Suslov, speaking in Lithuania on 28 November, argued that a "turn-about from cold war to cooperation among states with different social systems" had begun to emerge and he stressed the stability

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- S 2 -

of that process, observing that it has "deep, objective roots." Shelepov, in Turkmeniya on 25 December, also spoke of a "considerable shift" toward international cooperation and argued that "qualitative changes" in the international arena "have no equals in the postwar era in their scope and depth." Andropov, speaking in Estonia on 27 December, concluded that Soviet detente policy had "already brought major positive changes in the political climate and yielded real, tangible fruits." In a remark apparently addressed to critics of detente Andropov went on to observe that "our party has worked out the current and only true course under the present circumstances."

CHINA Only Polyanskiy among the Politburo orators failed to combine support for detente with strong criticism of Peking for alining itself with reactionary forces in the West. Those who broached the issue of bilateral relations with Peking, including Brezhnev and Kosygin, clearly indicated that they expected no basic change in the near future and that the next move was up to Peking. Defense Minister Grechko did seem to go beyond the other speakers in warning of the military danger from China. Speaking in Kazan on 8 January, he complained that Peking was talking about a threat from the north "to justify the enhancement of its nuclear missile potential."

EXCHANGE OF IDEAS On other issues related to detente, the Politburo members showed differing levels of concern over intellectual contacts with the West and questions of national security. Soviet leaders have without exception affirmed that they will not countenance interference in internal affairs for the sake of detente. But some have appeared more optimistic than others about the prospects for successfully coping with the dangers inevitably arising from increased East-West contacts. Brezhnev, at Tashkent and elsewhere, has clearly intimated that detente requires a substantial improvement in domestic indoctrination. At the same time, he has seemed almost eager to accept the risk. In recent speeches, the most visible concern about the ideological implications of detente was shown by Mazurov, Suslov, and Andropov. The attitude of the latter two might have been expected, given their responsibilities for ideological and internal security matters, although as was noted above they gave strong support to detente itself.

Andropov warned that imperialism "is attempting to step up its ideological penetration into the socialist countries," while Suslov and Mazurov spoke of the need for an intensification of the struggle against "ideological subversion." Mazurov, speaking

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- S 3 -

in Kirgiziya on 19 December, called for "a broad ideological offensive against the bourgeois world outlook and the development of a more sophisticated, consistent, flexible and effective propagation of our communist ideals." Other leaders speaking recently have devoted only passing attention to ideological issues or have ignored them altogether.

DEFENSE POSTURE There is substantial evidence of disagreement in Moscow regarding the relative roles of Soviet diplomacy and Soviet military power in improving the international climate and enhancing the Soviet role in world affairs. Because of its sensitivity, the public debate has been carefully guarded and expressed in esoteric forms. But its outlines have emerged since last summer following an exchange between civilian and military spokesmen on the issue.* Among top leaders, only Defense Minister Grechko in Kazan and Andrei Kirilenko, speaking in Georgia in October and at the October Revolution anniversary in early November, have since repeated the thesis of the military spokesmen that a direct correlation exists between the durability of detente and the growth of Soviet military power.

No Soviet leader has depreciated the role of Soviet military power in producing the improvement of the international climate. However, opinions have diverged over the validity of Grechko and Kirilenko's correlation--over whether Soviet diplomacy itself can now play an independent role in easing the military threat from the West and allowing some slackening in the growth of the Soviet military arsenal. Grechko seemed to make the strongest exception to such a possibility in his speech at Kazan, where he not only reiterated the RED STAR thesis linking detente and Soviet military power, but went on to warn against "voluntary or involuntary attempts to underestimate the military danger stemming from imperialism." He emphasized the point by declaring "the lessons of history teach that the imperialists heed only force."

* Earlier exchanges on this issue are reported in TRENDS Supplement of 23 August 1973, "Soviet Debate over Role of Military Power during Detente," and in the TRENDS of 26 September 1973, pages 3-4 and 7 November 1973, pages 6-7. The principals in the exchange at that time were USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov, writing in PRAVDA in July, and Col. I. I. Sideinikov and Capt. N. Shumikhin, writing in RED STAR in August and September.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- S 4 -

Grechko's observation that "the conditions of the international situation require that the Soviet people maintain their vigilance and tirelessly strengthen their defense capability" contrasts with Brezhnev's remark in Kiev last July that the international situation was "noticeably warmer," "making it easier to concentrate on the solution of peaceful, constructive tasks" -- a contrast that may be explained in part by the course of events in the intervening period.

The other side of the coin in the detente-defense argument is represented by statements stressing the role of Soviet diplomacy in bringing about the improved international atmosphere. Polyanskiy, in a 21 December speech in Tadzhikistan, virtually reversed the hardline thesis to argue that "the USSR's peace-loving foreign policy contributes to the strengthening of the might of the countries of the socialist community." He pointed in particular to the benefits of economic cooperation with the West. In general, however, leaders representing the opposite end of the spectrum from Grechko have been hard to identify. Instead, most leaders appear to have adopted a centrist position on this issue, paying deference to both a strong defense posture and an active diplomacy in consolidating and expanding on the recent improvement in East-West relations.

Brezhnev himself has been careful to avoid any vulnerability on this issue. He has often acknowledged the role of military might in the successes of Soviet foreign policy, especially in his earlier years. In his most recent speech in Havana on 30 January, he appeared to straddle the fence in observing that Moscow is confident about the future, "relying on our economic and defense might . . . and on the successes of our peace-loving foreign policy." While arguing last July that the improved international climate enabled the regime to concentrate on "peaceful, constructive tasks," at the World Peace Congress in late October he appeared to backtrack somewhat in his assessment of the progress of detente: "The military preparations of capitalist countries make it necessary for socialist states to assign the required sums for defense,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 FEBRUARY 1974

- S 5 -

diverting them from the tasks of peaceful construction."* On the other hand, he reaffirmed his centrist position by placing these remarks in the context of a lengthy argument for limiting the arms race based on the contention that a "durable peace" is incompatible with the continued existence of "powder-kegs capable of blowing up our entire planet."

That the Politburo consensus on the issues of detente and defense differs markedly from that of Grechko and other hard-liners is apparent from the varying assessments of the implications of the recent Middle East conflict. Brezhnev, on 29 November in India, and Kosygin, in Minsk on 14 November, had given official blessing to an assessment which denied that the war showed the superficiality of detente. "Had it not been for the shift toward relaxation of tension in international relations and toward the increasingly broad recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence," Kosygin declared, "the development of events in the Near East would likely have assumed a far more dangerous nature." In his Kazan speech, Grechko altered the spirit of this statement by placing the emphasis on considerations of power: "It was precisely the change in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism, and the process of relaxation of tension taking place on this basis, which prevented the dangerous eruption of war in the Near East from assuming dimensions threatening universal peace."

* Brezhnev went on to observe, in discussing the escalation of foreign military budgets, that "processes which constitute material preparation for world war are continuing and even intensifying." Those arguing against any slackening of military preparedness have seized upon Brezhnev's remarks. They have been cited only by Grechko and Politburo candidate member Ponomarev among the top leaders, and except for reproduction of a TASS report on Ponomarev's remarks, have appeared in the central press only in several RED STAR articles and editorials.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 FEBRUARY 1974

- 1 -

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 JANUARY - 3 FEBRUARY 1974

Moscow (2726 items)

Peking (865 items)

Brezhnev Cuban Visit	(15%)	47%	Domestic Issues	(49%)	60%
[Brezhnev Havana	(--)	9%]	[Criticism of Lin	(1%)	9%]
Rally Speech			Piao and Confucius		
[Castro Speeches	(3%)	7%]	Vietnam	(16%)	8%
Middle East	(7%)	4%	[Paracel Islands	(7%)	4%]
[Supreme Soviet	(--)	3%]	Dispute		
Delegations in			[Paris Agreement	(5%)	3%]
Syria, Egypt			Anniversary		
China	(8%)	3%	Attack on Antonioni	(--)	5%
USSR/British	(--)	3%	Film		
Diplomatic Relations					
50th Anniversary					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.